When an individual homebuyer’s right to exit collides with the collective decision to revive a stalled real-estate project
Case Note: Vivek Talwar & Ors. v. Rajesh Jhunjhunwala, Resolution Professional & Ors.
NCLT Mumbai, Court IV | I.A. (IB) No. 3688 of 2025 in C.P. (IB) No. 389/MB/2022 | Order dated 9 September 2026
You booked a flat. You paid substantial consideration. The promised possession date came and went. The developer failed to deliver. You invoked your right to withdraw and demanded a refund under Section 18 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA).
Then, before your dispute could reach its conclusion, the developer entered the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
A resolution plan emerged, promising to revive the project and complete the flats. But there was a catch: the plan stated that cancellation of units by homebuyers would not be entertained.
Could you still insist on your individual refund? Or would the collective decision to revive the project take precedence over your personal decision to exit?
That was the central question before the Mumbai Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) in Vivek Talwar & Ors. v. Rajesh Jhunjhunwala & Ors., decided on 9 September 2026.
The answer is an important reminder: in insolvency, an individual homebuyer’s preferred remedy may have to yield to the collective resolution process.
The dispute: Two homebuyers wanted their money back
The applicants had booked flats in the Altavista project being developed by Spenta Enclave Private Limited. They had paid approximately ₹89.23 lakh and ₹86.71 lakh respectively.
The developer failed to deliver possession within the stipulated contractual period. The homebuyers asserted their right to seek a refund under Section 18 of RERA and had initiated proceedings before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in July 2022.
There was an important chronological detail: these consumer proceedings had commenced before CIRP was initiated against the developer on 24 March 2023.
After commencement of CIRP, the applicants submitted their claims to the Resolution Professional (RP), and their claims were admitted. However, the RP informed them that the project was being taken up for completion and asked them to pay the balance consideration.
The applicants refused. They wanted to exit the project and recover their money.
The resolution plan, however, provided that cancellation of units by homebuyers would not be entertained.
The applicants approached the NCLT seeking reconsideration or modification of the plan so that their individual refund rights under RERA would be recognised.
The Tribunal’s answer: You cannot have an individual exit outside the insolvency framework
The NCLT dismissed the application. Its reasoning rested on several important considerations.
1. The resolution applicant does not automatically inherit every obligation of the old promoter
The homebuyers argued that the successful resolution applicant (SRA), upon taking over the project, would step into the shoes of the original promoter and become bound by the Agreements for Sale and the obligations under RERA.
The Tribunal did not accept this argument.
It observed that the resolution plan was still awaiting approval by the NCLT. The SRA had not yet assumed responsibility for developing or completing the project. Its obligation to complete the project would arise under the resolution plan and after its approval.
The Tribunal therefore held that the SRA could not, at that stage, be treated as having automatically assumed every contractual obligation of the erstwhile promoter, including the obligation to refund the applicants under their original Agreements for Sale.
This is a significant distinction: the obligations of a successful resolution applicant must be examined in the context of the approved resolution plan and the IBC framework, rather than simply equated with every obligation of the previous management.
2. The majority decision of homebuyers matters
Homebuyers constitute a class of financial creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
In this case, homebuyers collectively held approximately 22.66% voting share in the Committee of Creditors (CoC). Their Authorised Representative had voted in favour of the resolution plan in accordance with the class decision.
The four applicants together held only approximately 0.22% voting share. The resolution plan had received 92.87% approval from the CoC.
Relying on Section 25A(3A) of the IBC, the Tribunal held that an individual member of the homebuyers’ class could not overturn the collective decision taken by the class through its Authorised Representative.
In other words, an individual homebuyer cannot necessarily insist that the resolution plan accommodate a personal preference when the statutory class mechanism has produced a contrary collective decision.
3. RERA and IBC coexist, but there is a limit
This is arguably the most important legal proposition in the judgment.
The Tribunal did not hold that RERA becomes inapplicable merely because CIRP commences. On the contrary, it recognised that the two enactments operate in different spheres:
- RERA protects the interests of individual homebuyers, including their rights to possession, refund and compensation.
- The IBC provides a collective, time-bound mechanism for resolving the insolvency of a corporate debtor and balancing the interests of its stakeholders.
However, where a particular remedy under RERA conflicts with the insolvency resolution framework, Section 238 of the IBC gives the IBC overriding effect.
The Tribunal held that the applicants could not insist upon a separate individualised refund remedy outside the collective insolvency process.
The distinction is important. RERA does not disappear in insolvency. But an individual RERA remedy cannot automatically override the statutory resolution mechanism under the IBC.
The part of the judgment that deserves closer attention
There is an interesting feature of this case which should not be lost in the broader discussion.
The applicants claimed that they had already exercised their termination and refund rights before commencement of CIRP. They had also initiated consumer proceedings before the insolvency process began.
This raises an important question:
Is there a difference between a homebuyer who seeks to withdraw after commencement of CIRP and one who claims to have validly terminated the Agreement for Sale and demanded a refund before CIRP commenced?
The legal position may not necessarily be identical.
The Tribunal recorded the applicants’ assertion that termination notices had been issued before CIRP. However, it did not undertake a detailed examination of whether those notices had validly terminated the Agreements for Sale, whether the refund liability had crystallised, or how such a liability should be treated under the IBC.
That is a significant aspect of the judgment which deserves further consideration.
There was also another ground for dismissal. The applicants had previously filed separate applications seeking refunds, and those applications had been dismissed by the Tribunal in June and August 2024. The applicants had not challenged those orders before the Appellate Authority. The NCLT considered that the present proceedings substantially re-agitated issues that had already attained finality.
Thus, the decision did not rest solely on the conflict between RERA and the IBC. The earlier orders and the statutory class-voting mechanism also played an important role.
What should homebuyers learn from this decision?
For homebuyers in stalled real-estate projects, this judgment carries some practical lessons.
1. File your claim before the Resolution Professional.
Do not assume that an existing dispute before a consumer commission or RERA authority will, by itself, secure the treatment of your claim in CIRP. Submit the claim in the prescribed manner and preserve proof of submission and admission.
2. Do not treat possession and refund as interchangeable remedies.
Clearly identify whether your claim is for possession, refund, interest, compensation or another contractual or statutory entitlement. Examine how each is treated under the resolution plan.
3. Read the resolution plan carefully.
Pay particular attention to provisions concerning cancellation of units, possession timelines, completion obligations, treatment of admitted claims, interest and compensation.
4. Understand the role of the Authorised Representative.
Homebuyers participate in the CoC through the statutory class-representation mechanism. Individual allottees should understand how the class decision is taken and how their voting rights are exercised.
5. Do not allow adverse orders to attain finality without considering an appeal.
The applicants in this case faced an additional difficulty because their earlier refund applications had been dismissed and those orders had not been challenged.
Our view: Insolvency changes the playing field
This decision highlights a difficult reality in real-estate insolvency.
A homebuyer may have a legitimate grievance against a developer. The failure to deliver possession may give rise to statutory and contractual remedies. Yet, once the developer enters CIRP, the dispute is no longer simply between an allottee and a builder.
It becomes part of a collective insolvency process involving secured creditors, financial creditors, homebuyers as a class, the resolution applicant and other stakeholders.
The individual homebuyer’s right to seek a refund must then be examined alongside the statutory objective of resolving the corporate debtor and preserving the possibility of project completion.
That does not mean that every individual right can be brushed aside in the name of commercial wisdom. The IBC itself prescribes safeguards, including the requirements under Section 30(2), and the Adjudicating Authority retains its statutory scrutiny over the resolution plan.
Nor does this judgment conclusively settle every situation in which a homebuyer invokes Section 18 of RERA. In particular, the position of an allottee who validly exercised termination and refund rights before commencement of CIRP deserves closer judicial examination.
The larger lesson is this: a homebuyer’s right to demand a refund and the right to participate in a collective resolution are not necessarily the same thing. In insolvency, knowing the difference can make all the difference.
Legal Note: This case note discusses the order of the NCLT Mumbai dated 9 September 2026 in I.A. (IB) No. 3688 of 2025. It is intended for general legal information and should not be treated as advice on the facts of any particular matter.