Author: Advocate Douglas Jose Lopez

  • Two-Thirds Must Be Elected, But Two-Thirds of What? The Unresolved Question in Suresh Agarwal v. Sudhir Agarwal

    In brief: In Suresh Agarwal & Ors. v. Sudhir Agarwal & Ors. (decided on 5 December 2025), Justice Amit Borkar of the Bombay High Court held that the requirement that more than two-thirds of a managing committee be elected is a continuing one: it must be met throughout the committee’s tenure, not merely on the day of election. But the judgment gives two different bases for counting that two-thirds where reserved seats remain vacant for want of candidates, and does not say which applies during the tenure. Until that is authoritatively clarified, many societies cannot tell with certainty whether their committees are validly functioning.

    The statutory requirement

    Section 154B-19(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 provides that the managing committee of a housing society is treated as constituted when more than two-thirds of its sanctioned strength has been elected. “More than” is exacting: for a committee of 15, two-thirds is exactly 10, so 10 elected members are not enough and at least 11 are required.

    Section 154B-22 separately enables a committee to function, and hold its meetings, even where reserved seats remain vacant because no eligible candidate came forward.

    The ratio of the judgment

    Three propositions emerge from the judgment.

    1. The requirement is continuing. In paragraphs 25 and 30 to 33, the Court explained that the requirement of the prescribed elected strength is not confined to the date of election. It continues throughout the tenure. If the elected strength later falls below the threshold through resignation, death, disqualification or any other cause, the validity of the committee’s continued functioning is open to question.

    2. Section 154B-22 does not dilute the two-thirds rule. In paragraph 26, the Court held:

    “Section 154B-22 does not dilute the requirement of more than two third. It only ensures that the committee can hold meetings even when reserved seats remain vacant due to lack of candidates. It does not say that reserved seats should be excluded while deciding whether more than two third of the committee is elected. If that was intended, the Legislature would have said so directly. It did not.”

    3. The law does not expect the impossible. In paragraph 38, dealing with constitution under Section 154B-19(2), the Court held:

    “… when a reserved seat was not contestable at all due to lack of nominations, it would be unreasonable to insist that the committee must still produce more than two third of 19. The law cannot expect the impossible. In such a situation, the requirement of ‘elected members’ is applied to the seats that were actually available for contest. If only 18 seats were available for election, then the threshold of more than two third applies to those 18 seats.”

    The challenge: two-thirds of what?

    Paragraph 26 counts the two-thirds against the full sanctioned strength, reserved seats included. Paragraph 38 counts it against the seats actually available for contest, leaving out reserved seats for which no nomination was received. The difference is not academic. Take a committee with a sanctioned strength of 15, in which two reserved seats attracted no eligible nomination, so that only 13 seats went to the poll:

    Basis of calculationTwo-thirdsElected members required
    Full sanctioned strength (15), as in paragraph 2610At least 11
    Seats actually available for contest (13), as in paragraph 388.67At least 9

    If 13 members are elected, the committee clears both thresholds. But suppose three members later resign. With 10 elected members remaining, the committee still satisfies the paragraph 38 test (10 is more than two-thirds of 13), but fails the paragraph 26 test (10 is not more than two-thirds of 15). Is that committee still lawfully functioning?

    The judgment does not expressly answer this. Paragraph 38 is framed in terms of constitution under Section 154B-19(2); the continuing requirement is discussed in paragraphs 25 and 30 to 33; and the judgment does not state how the “seats available for contest” approach is to be reconciled with the continuing requirement during the tenure. Read one way, a committee that was validly constituted may lose its legitimacy mid-term on a count it could never have met; read the other way, the same committee carries on lawfully.

    Why authoritative clarification is needed

    Vacant reserved seats are common in housing societies, because eligible members in a reserved category are often few or unwilling to stand. Every such society now faces the same uncertainty, and the consequences of guessing wrong are serious: decisions taken, accounts operated and contracts signed by a committee whose functioning is later held to be invalid can all be challenged.

    The question deserves an authoritative answer, whether from the High Court in an appropriate case, or from the State Government through the rules or the model bye-laws, which can expressly state the basis on which the two-thirds requirement is to be counted during the tenure of a committee.

    What societies should do meanwhile

    • Record the facts. Keep on file the sanctioned strength fixed by the Registrar, the seats for which no nomination was received, and the number of members elected.
    • Watch the count. Recalculate the elected strength on both bases whenever a member resigns, dies or is disqualified.
    • Do not act on assumptions. A committee that is told to step down should not do so, and members should not treat it as invalid, merely on the more restrictive reading, without considered legal advice on how the judgment applies to their facts.
    • Seek clarity early. Where the count falls between the two thresholds, take advice promptly and consider approaching the Registrar for directions.

    The purpose of the judgment is to ensure that committees genuinely represent the members. Applying it harmoniously, so that a democratically elected committee is neither propped up below the legal minimum nor unseated on an impossible count, is the task that now remains.


    LexCel Case Note. This note is general information on the law as at the date of publication and is not legal advice. Readers should obtain specific advice on their own facts.

  • No Registrar’s Order, No New Signatories: When Banks May Change a Housing Society’s Account Mandate

    In brief: A co-operative housing society’s new managing committee does not come into legal existence merely because the Returning Officer has declared the election result in Form E-17. It is constituted only when the Registrar (in practice, the Deputy Registrar) passes a specific order constituting it. Until that order is passed, banks should not change the mandate of the society’s bank account.

    The common misconception

    After a society election, the newly elected members usually approach the society’s bank with the Returning Officer’s result and ask for the account mandate to be changed in their favour. Many banks act on that request. Most societies, and many committee members, believe that the committee is fully constituted the moment the Returning Officer declares the result. That is not the correct legal position.

    What the election rules require

    Under Rule 76-O(3) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies (Election to Committee) Rules, 2014, the election process for a housing society moves in two distinct stages:

    1. Declaration of result. The Returning Officer declares the result in Form E-17 and forwards it to the Registrar.
    2. Constitution of the committee. On receiving Form E-17, the Registrar constitutes the managing committee by passing an order to that effect.

    The declaration of the result and the constitution of the committee are therefore separate legal acts, performed by two different authorities.

    What the Bombay High Court has held

    In Kamble v. State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No. 7583 of 2025), Justice Amit Borkar of the Bombay High Court has held that a managing committee is legally constituted only when the Deputy Registrar constitutes it by an order. The Returning Officer’s report in Form E-17 is a step towards constitution; it is not the constitution itself (see paragraphs 18, 19 and 29 of the judgment).

    It follows that until the Deputy Registrar passes that order, the newly elected members have not yet become a legally constituted managing committee, however clear their electoral mandate may be.

    When should a bank change the mandate?

    A bank holds the society’s funds and acts on the instructions of its lawfully constituted committee. The correct sequence is:

    1. The Returning Officer declares the result in Form E-17 and submits it to the Registrar.
    2. The Deputy Registrar passes a specific order constituting the managing committee.
    3. The committee elects its office-bearers.
    4. Only then does the bank change the mandate, on production of a certified copy of the Deputy Registrar’s order constituting the committee, together with the resolution appointing the authorised signatories.

    A mandate changed on the strength of the Returning Officer’s result alone rests on an incomplete process, and any operation of the account under it is open to challenge.

    What this means for societies and members

    • Newly elected committees should obtain a copy of the Deputy Registrar’s order constituting the committee before approaching the bank.
    • Banks should ask for that order, not merely Form E-17, before accepting new signatories.
    • Members who doubt whether a committee was validly constituted can ask the Deputy Registrar’s office, including through an application under the Right to Information Act, whether an order constituting the committee has been passed.

    Getting this sequence right protects the society’s funds, the bank, and the committee members themselves.


    LexCel Case Note. This note is general information on the law as at the date of publication and is not legal advice. Readers should obtain specific advice on their own facts.

  • Earning Wife, Same Lifestyle: Why a Working Wife Is Still Entitled to Maintenance

    In brief: A wife who earns is not, for that reason alone, disentitled to maintenance. The test applied by the Supreme Court and the High Courts is not whether she can survive on her own income, but whether that income is enough to let her live with dignity at the standard of living she enjoyed in the matrimonial home. Where it is not, the husband must make up the difference in keeping with his means.

    Where it began

    When this note was first published in January 2017, it reported an unusual decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (Justice Rekha Mittal) in Amit Kumar v. Navjot Dubey. The wife, a government school teacher, earned more than her husband, yet the Court directed him to pay her ₹15,000 a month, holding that she was entitled to the same amenities of life she would have enjoyed in the matrimonial home and taking into account the expenses of the two children living with her.

    What was then an interesting exception has since become settled law.

    The governing principles: Rajnesh v. Neha

    In Rajnesh v. Neha (2021) 2 SCC 324, the Supreme Court laid down comprehensive guidelines for fixing maintenance. Among the factors the court must weigh are the status of the parties, the reasonable needs of the wife and children, the wife’s qualifications and employment, her independent income, and the standard of living she enjoyed in the matrimonial home. The wife’s income is a relevant factor; it is not a bar. The real question is whether it is sufficient to maintain her at that standard.

    The latest judgments

    Supreme Court, January 2026: education and earning capacity are no answer

    In Anamika Jain v. Dr. Atul Jain, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 111 (Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and R. Mahadevan, 28 January 2026), the husband, a doctor earning about ₹1.6 lakh a month, argued that his former wife was highly qualified, could support herself and had her parents to fall back on. The Supreme Court rejected the argument, held that after divorce a wife is entitled to live consistently with the standard of living she was accustomed to during the marriage, and doubled her permanent alimony from ₹15,000 to ₹30,000 a month. Neither her education nor her parents’ means was a ground to deny or reduce maintenance where her own income could not sustain that lifestyle.

    Supreme Court, April 2026: maintenance must not be illusory

    In Deepa Joshi v. Gaurav Joshi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 387 (Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih, 16 April 2026), the Court held that maintenance must enable the wife to live with dignity and at a standard commensurate with that enjoyed during the marriage, and that a husband cannot shrink his liability by pointing to voluntary deductions from his salary. The award must strike a just balance between the husband’s real earning capacity and the wife’s reasonable needs.

    Bombay High Court: an earning teacher still entitled

    In X v. Y, 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 2505 (Justice Manjusha Deshpande, 18 June 2025), the wife was an assistant teacher earning about ₹18,000 a month, while the husband earned over ₹1 lakh. Upholding interim maintenance of ₹15,000 a month, the Court held that merely because the wife was earning, she could not be deprived of support at the standard of living she was accustomed to in the matrimonial home.

    Delhi High Court, 2026: a professor’s salary is not the yardstick

    In Shikha Badhani v. Hemant Badhani (Justices Navin Chawla and Renu Bhatnagar, reported in May 2026), the wife was an assistant professor earning about ₹1.25 lakh a month; the husband, a senior computer scientist in the United States, earned over ₹1 crore a year. The Family Court had refused her maintenance because she could support herself. The High Court set that aside, held that a wife’s employment is not an absolute bar, measured self-sufficiency against the matrimonial standard of living rather than bare subsistence, and enhanced the award to ₹1.5 lakh a month for the wife and child.

    What the law now is

    • Earning is not a bar. A wife’s employment or income does not by itself defeat her claim to maintenance.
    • The yardstick is the matrimonial standard of living, not survival. She is entitled to live with dignity, as she lived during the marriage.
    • Disparity matters. Where the husband earns substantially more, the court may direct him to bridge the gap between her income and what that standard requires.
    • Education and parental support are no answer. That a wife is qualified, or that her parents can support her, does not discharge the husband’s obligation.
    • Full disclosure is required. Both parties must disclose their assets and income on affidavit, as directed in Rajnesh v. Neha, and the court looks at real earning capacity, not salary manipulated by voluntary deductions.

    The limits

    The principle is not a licence for a well-provided spouse. Courts continue to weigh the wife’s actual income against the husband’s: where her own earnings already allow her to maintain the matrimonial standard, or the parties’ incomes are comparable, maintenance may be refused or reduced. Each case turns on its own figures.

    Where the claim can be made

    A wife may claim maintenance under Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (which replaced Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure from 1 July 2024), interim maintenance and permanent alimony under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and monetary relief under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, among other laws, depending on her personal law and circumstances.


    LexCel Case Note. First published January 2017; updated November 2026. This note is general information on the law as at the date of update and is not legal advice. Readers should obtain specific advice on their own facts.